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within a reasonable time, In re Pamne-supra, and an estate cannot be
re-opened to remove the bar of the statute of limitations provided in Sec. i Id
of the Bankruptcy Act. Kinder v. Scharf-?z31 U.S. 517, 58 L. ed. 343,
34 S. Ct. 164-19i 3 . Such a means for reaching unabandoned, unadmin-
istered property should, it is submitted, be exclusive.
If it were possible to show, in the principal case, that Parsons' trustee had
notice of the claim against Whitehead's decedent, the case might be taken out
of the category of cases in which the bankrupt may not "ordinarily bring suit"
on a pre-bankruptcy claim.
ROBERT B. GOSLINE.
INJURY SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF VIOLATION
OF HOURS OF LABOR STATUTE
The plaintiff in her petition alleged that she was sixteen years of age, as
the defendant knew, and that she was employed by the defendant i zy to
x3y2 hours per day, and 75 to 80 hours a week in violation of sections 11,996
of the Ohio General Code, which provided that no girl under eighteen
should be employed more than eight hours in any one day nor more than
forty-eight hours in any one week. Plaintiff further alleged that as a proxi-
mate result of defendant's violation of the statute, she became physically
exhausted, suffered nervous breakdown, was forced to seek medical attention,
was caused great embarrassment, and mental distress, and was damaged to the
extent of $ 5,ooo. The trial court sustained a demurrer to her petition,
which the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J.,
dissenting, held that the demurrer was properly sustained. Mabley & Carer
Co. v. Lee, a minor, 129 Ohio St. 69 (934).
The majority opinion recognized that plaintiff was attempting to main-
tain an action at common law, but held that the constitutional provision relat-
ing to Workmen's Compensation barred any such action. They did not
decide, nor was it necessary for them to do so, whether the plaintiff could
recover anything under that act.
Article II, section 35, of the Ohio Constitution provides that laws may
be passed for the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their
defendents for death, injuries, or occupational disease, occasioned in the
course of employment and that such compensation shall be in lieu of all other
rights to compensation, or damages for such death, injuries, or occupational
disease.
It would seem that plaintiff could not have recovered in Workman's
Compensation for death, injury, or occupational disease. She is alive. She
has no occupational disease. Industrial Commission of Oio v. Roth, 98 Ohio
St. 34, 38, ilo N.E. 172, 173, 6 A.L.R. 1463, 1465, (1918, General Code
section i 4 6 5-68A. Now has she suffered an injury as the term has been
construed in the act? The court has repeatedly held that the injury must
be traumatic. Industrial Commisson of Ohi v. Armacost, 1z9 Ohio St. 176
(935), (there is no such evidence (of trauma) in the case now before us);
Industrial Commission of Ohi v. Middleto", 126 Ohio St. ziI, 184 N.E.
APRIL) 1935 145
835, (1935. Compare Great Atlantc & Pactfic Tea Company v. Sexton, 242
Ky. z66, 46 S.W (2nd) 87 (932). "The term injury as used in Ohio
Workman's Compensation law comprehends only such injuries as are acci-
dental in their origin and cause." lndustril Commission of Ohio v. Granhen,
i6 Ohio St. 299, 185 N.E. 199, (1933).
But does the constitutional provision prohibit an action at common law?
The majority argue that the provision was to benefit employers as well as
employees. It is true that "open liability" is abolished, and that the employer
is freed from the risk of extremely large damages for a compensible injury.
It is another matter, however, to absolve the employer from common law
liability for a wrong that is not compensible under the Compensation Act.
Since the constitutional provision says that compensation shall be in lieu of
all other compensation for such death, injury or occupational disease, it might
easily be construed to mean only such injuries as are compensible. In line
with the prevailing tendency to construe such clauses liberally in favor of
employees, the construction would be justified.
It must be admitted that Zalachuch v. The Willard Storage Battery Co.,
xo6 Ohio St. 538, 14o N.E. 405, (192z), affords some support for the posi-
t!on of the majority, although the court did say there that it was not necessary
to decide whether an action existed at common law. But the act has been held
not to bar a common law action against a third person for the injury although
both the employer and the third person were subscribers under the act, Ohio
Public Service Co. v. Sharkey, Amd'r, 117 Ohio St. 584, 16o N.E. 687,
(1928). Nor does it absolve a railroad company from liability under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act for an injury to an employee of a construc-
tion company, hired by the defendant and required by the contract to comply
with the state Workman's Compensation Law, Erie R. Co. v. Margue 28 Fed.(2nd) 644, (1928).
If the constitutional provision was construed so as not to bar an action at
Common law in this situation the question would remain, "Does the plaintiff's
petition state a cause of action at common law?"
The hours of labor statute was obviously passed for the protection of
people in the class of the plaintiff. In fact, the constiution,.lity of such
statutes have been upheld on this ground. Miller v. Wilson 236 U.S. 373,
35 S. Ct. 342, (1915). The Ohio Supreme Court has held on numerous
occasions that violations of statutes and ordinances, intended for the protection
of the plaintiff constitute negligence per se. Violating a speed law passed
for protection of the public is negligence per se, Schell v. Du Boss, Adm'r.,
94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, (1916), employment of minor at every wheel
in violation of statute held negligence per se, Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co. v.
Sheller, IO8, Ohio St. io6, 141 N.E. 89 (1923), Railure of a mine operator
to keep a mine free of gas is violation of statute held to be negligence per se,
Krause v. Morgan, 53 Ohio St. 26, 4o N.E. 886, (1895), Failure to insulate
high tension wires in violation of staute held negligence per se, Arnold v.
Ohio Gas and Electric Co., 24o A. 435, 15 N.E. 828, (1928), and employ-
ment of minor in violation of Child Labor Statute, held to be negligence per
se, Steel Car Forge Co. v. Ohio, 184 F. 868 (1911). See section 286, Re-
statement of the Law of Torts.
Violation of hours of labor statute has been held to be negligence per se.
Thus in Inland Steel Co. v. Yednach, 172 Ind. 423, 87 N.E. 2±9, (19o9),
under an act prohibiting the employment in a manufacturing establishment of
persons under sixteen for more than sixty hours in a week or ten hours in a
day, it was held negligence per se for a steel company, to employ a boy within
the prohibited age, and require him to work more than the maximum number
of hours and the boy fell asleep near the furnace track because of exhaustion
from working more than the statutory number of hours, and was injured by
an ore car run at an unusual time.
Even if we recognized that defendant was negligent the plaintiff, could
not recover without proof of injury. The law does not recognize mental
pain as sufficient to maintain an action for negligence in the ordinary situation.
The obligations of great embarrassment and mental distress in the petition,
standing alone, would not support a cause of action. But does the allegation
of a nervous breakdown fall into the same lassification? Many early cases
denied recovery against a negligent defendant, to a plaintiff, who has suffered
a nervous breakdown, parlysis, insanity or miscarriage. Victorian Railways
Commssion v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888), Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,
151 N.Y 107, N.E. (1896), Ervring v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. Louis Ry.,
147 Penn. 40, 23 A. 438, (1892). Decisions were placed on various
grounds; (i) lack of precedent, (z) no recovery for mental injury; (3) no
recovery for fright, and therefore none for the results of fright; (4) lack of
proximate cause. None of these arguments affords a sufficient justification for
the result. If there had been no precedent there soon were many More satis-
factory medical knowledge showed that injuries were physical and not mental.
Recovery was denied for fright on the ground that it was mental and beneath
notice, but when physical injuries were established, the argument did not
apply The result was frequently direct and causation abundantly established.
Many courts recognized the justice of the plaintiff's case and held from the
beginning that plaintiff could recover. Purcell v. St. Paul Ry., 48 Minn. 134,
5o N.W 1034, (1897), Hill v. Kimball, 76 Texas 21o; 13 S.W 59
(189o), Mack v. South Bound R. Co. 52 S. C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898).
Some of the courts which just denied recovery soon reversed their posi-
tion. Thus England has long recognized that plaintiff might maintain an
action. DuLieu v. White & Sons (1901) 2K.I 3 .66 9 . Other courts denied
recovery on the ground of expediency alone, arguing that such injuries might
easily be feigned. Spade v. Lynn v. B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 785, 47 N.E. 88,
(1897). This offers the only plausible ground for the defendant and few
cases in recent years have attempted to justify a denial of recovery on any
other reason. Cornstoch v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431, (1931).
The view permitting recovery has been steadily gaining ground and has now
been accepted in a majority of jurisdictions. See Hallen, Hill v. Kimball, A
Milepost in the Law, 12 Texas Law Review I. (1933).
The Ohio Supreme Court, in the case of Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S.W.
R. Co. 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499, (19o8) denied recovery against a
negligent defendant. Reexamination of the doctrines denying recovery with-
out impact in other jurisdictions has frequently led to its rejection as a serious
limitation upon it. Unless the doctrine is limited, it would prove a decided
obstacle to plaintiff's attempt to base an action here upon any theory of
negligence.
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The majority's decision that the Workman's Compensation Act was
exclusive, made it unnecessary for them to discuss any other points. It is
submitted that the able dissenting opinion of Judge Zimmerman is the
sounder. It would seem that the Workman's Compensation Act should be
construed so as to exclude wrongs that are not compensible under the act, and
that if the defendant violated the hours of labor statute, it was negligent to
the plaintiff. While plaintiff might have difficulty in establishing any phys-
ical injury at the trial, it would seem that the allegation of a nervous break-
down should be regarded as sufficient against a demurrer.
SEyouR A. TRETELMAN.
